I learn Kant (2)

In regard to logical quantity all judgements of taste are singular judgements. For since I must immediately hold the object up to my feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and yet not through concepts, it cannot have the quantity of an objectively generally valid judgement, although if the singular representation of the object of the judgement of taste in accordance with the condition that determine the latter is transformed into a concept through comparison, then a logically u...niversal judgement can arise from it ;e.g., by means of a judgement of taste I declare the rose that I am gazing to be beautiful. By contrast, the judgement that arises from the comparison of many singular ones, that roses in general are beautiful, is no longer pronounced merely as an aesthetic judgement, but as an aesthetically grounded logical judgement. Now the judgement that the rose is (in its use) agreeable is also, to be sure, an aesthetic and singular judgement, but not a judgement of taste, rather a judgement of senses. That is to say, it differs from the former in that the judgement of taste carries with it an aesthetic quantity of universality, i.e.,validity for everyone, which cannot be found in the judgement about agreeable. Only judgements about the good alone, although they also determine the satisfaction in an object, have logical and not merely aesthetic validity, for they are valid of the object, as cognitions of it, and are therefore valid for everyone. (Kant)

 
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