1 カントの近代

1 カントの近代  

カント KANTは五十代半ばから十年間の間に、「純粋理性批判」(1781年)、「実践理性批判」(1788年)、「判断力批判」(1790年) を執筆していった。三冊の序文を一緒に並べて比較してみただけでも、新しい本を書くたびに、カントがいかに自己の思考を差異化していったかがわかる。

A <Introduction, Critique of Pure Reason , Kant , 1781>
1, The idea of transcendental philosophy.
Experience is without doubt first product that our understanding brings forth as it works on the raw material of sensible sensations. It is for this very reason the first teaching, and in its progress it is so inexhausible in new instructio...n that the chain of life in all future generations will never have any lack of new instruction of new information that can be gathered on this terrain.Nevertheless it is far from the only field to which our understanding can be restricted. It tells us, to be sure, what is , but never that it must necessarily be thus and not otherwise. For that very reason it gives un no true universality, and reson, which is so desirous of this kind of cognitions, is more stimulated than satisfied by it. Now such universal cognitions, which at the same times have the character of inner necessity, must be clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience ; hence one calls them a priori cognitions; whereas that which ie merely borrowed from experience is , as it is put, cognized only a posteriori, or empirically.

B <Preface, Critique of Practical Reason, Kant, 1788>
This work is called the 'Critical Examination of Practical Reason' , not of the pure reason, although its paralleilism with the speculative critique would seem to require the latter term. The reason of this appears sugufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show that, there is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it criticizes the entire practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in this, it had no need to criticise the pure faculty itself in order to see whether reason in making such a claim does not presumptuously overstep itself (as is the case with the speculative reason). For if, as pure reason, it is actually practical, it proves its own reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all disputation against the possibility of its being real is futile.

C < Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgement , Kant 1790>
1, On philosophy as a system
If philosophy is the sysytem of rational cognition through concepts, it is thereby already sufficiently distinguished from a critique of pure reason, which, although it contains a philosophical investigation of the possibility of such cognition, does not belong to such a system as a part , but rather outlines and examines the very idea of it in the first place.